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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH# 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920702-CA 
v. : 
VAN D. SCOTT, : Priority No. 2 
De f endant/Appe11ant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for burglary, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990) ; 
theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-404 (1990); and being a habitual criminal, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Is the evidence sufficient to support defendant's 
conviction for theft? 
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, Utah 
appellate courts view the evidence and all inferences that may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Lemons. 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992). A jury verdict will 
only be reversed where reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989); 
Lemons, 844 P.2d at 381. 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in enhancing 
defendant's sentence based on a finding of habitual criminal? 
This Court reviews the trial court's imposition of 
sentence "to discover any abuse of discretion[.]" State v. Rhodes, 
818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991)• Where the particular issues 
raised concern a question of law, a correction of error standard is 
employed. Id. "For questions of fact, frequently constituting 
threshold inquiries that must be satisfied prior to addressing the 
legal intricacies, a 'clearly erroneous' standard applies." Ld. at 
1049-50 (quoting State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 
1991)). Further, a correctness review "necessarily incorporates" 
review of the lower court's factual findings including any 
associated credibility determinations. Id. at 1050 (quoting 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.3)). "This subsidiary determination 
will be overturned only if clearly erroneous." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes 
and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with burglary, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990); theft, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
2 
(1990); and being a habitual criminal in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990).* 
Following a jury trial on the burglary and theft charges, 
defendant was convicted as charged (R. 98-99). Because defendant 
waived his right to a jury trial on the habitual criminal charge, 
the trial court made that determination under section 76-8-1001 
(Transcript of jury trial, February 25, 1991 [hereinafter T.] at 
106-09) (a copy of the trial court's determination of the habitual 
criminal charge is contained in the Addendum). 
The trial court then sentenced defendant to concurrent 
terms of zero to five years for burglary, and to an enhanced term 
of five years to life for theft under section 76-8-1001 (R. 110-11; 
T. 106-09, see Addendum). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Scott Vanleeuwen, owner of the Gift House, a pawn shop 
and sporting goods store located at 120 - 25th Street, Ogden, Utah, 
worked after closing time on September 26, 1990, preparing for an 
anticipated "deer season rush" (T. 8-10). Before leaving the Gift 
House at approximately 7:15 p.m. that evening, Vanleeuwen set an 
alarm that was "wired directly to the police department" (T. 10). 
After securing the store, Vanleeuwen exited the front entrance and 
walked east on 25th Street where he noticed two black men loitering 
nearby (T. 11) . As Vanleeuwen approached his truck parked 
approximately two to three hundred feet from the Gift House, he 
1
 Section 76-8-1001 was amended, effective April 29, 
1991, which amendment is not material to the issues raised here. 
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observed that the two men split up (T. 12). One went "around the 
side of a building and the other walked into a doorway, put his 
back to [Vanleeuwen] " and urinated (T. 12) . Vanleeuwen was not 
able to see either man's face (T. 12). Although Vanleeuwen was 
initially concerned by the men's behavior, it was not unusual to 
see "transient[s] " in the area and he dismissed the incident and 
continued home (T. 13, 26). 
Upon arriving home at approximately 8:00 p.m., Vanleeuwen 
learned the police had telephoned and that the Gift House had been 
burglarized (T. 13). Vanleeuwen immediately returned to the Gift 
House where he observed that the front entrance had been kicked in 
(T. 14). Inside the store, Vanleeuwen saw "jewelry scattered on 
the floor" (T. 14). Additionally, he observed that "the jewelry 
case was smashed in[,]" and there was "[a] lot of blood on the 
floor" (T. 14) . He further observed a rock laying in the middle of 
the "rubble" (T. 14). Vanleeuwen followed a blood trail from the 
front entrance across 25th Street and into a vacant lot 
approximately 100 yards south of the Gift House, recovering some of 
the missing jewelry along the way (T. 18, 24) . Vanleeuwen 
estimated that approximately $15,000 worth of merchandise was taken 
(T. 22) . 
Investigating officers continued following the blood 
trail which led to an apartment complex located at 140 - 28th 
Street (T. 79) . The blood trail entered apartment #9 where it 
ended in the bathroom (T. 79-80) . Although the officers determined 
the suspect was no longer in the apartment, there was no blood 
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trail leaving the apartment (T. 80) . Upon talking to the resident, 
Albert Taylor, police learned that Taylor had given defendant a 
towel to stop a bleeding wound (T. 80) . Defendant, whom Taylor had 
known for years, did not explain how he injured himself (T. 91). 
From Taylor's apartment, police searched a home located 
at 132 Doxey Street at the request of the residents who thought 
they had heard someone inside the house (T. 80) . A blood soaked 
towel matching the description given by ,Taylor was found in the 
backyard of the residence (T. 79-80). Officers continued searching 
for another one/half hour before a search dog was brought in to 
assist (T. 81) • The search dog picked up the blood trail near 
Doxey Street and followed it northeast to a nearby vacant field 
where defendant was discovered "lying on the ground with his shirt 
off. He had his shirt around his wrist which was bleeding" (T. 
81) . No jewelry or other property belonging to the Gift House was 
found on defendant's person at the time of his apprehension (T. 
85). 
Defendant was administered first aid for his wound and 
transported to McKay Hospital where he was given Miranda2 warnings 
(T. 83). Defendant agreed to speak to investigating officers and 
at first denied involvement in the burglary/theft of the Gift House 
(T. 83-84). However, when he was informed that the officers had 
followed a blood trail from the Gift House to his hiding place, 
defendant requested a "deal" (T. 83) . Specifically, defendant 
offered to "give up" some "drug people" and plead to a lesser 
2
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
5 
offense (T. 84). When Officer Clements, of the Ogden City Police 
Department, told defendant he lacked authority to make a deal, 
defendant indicated he was still willing to talk (T. 84) . 
Defendant then admitted to Officer Clements 
that he was with another black male by the 
name of Charles out in front of the Gift 
House, That the other black male . . . kicked 
in the Gift House Door. That he went into the 
business with the [sic] Charles and he smashed 
out the jewelry window inside the business. 
(T. 84) . Although defendant admitted smashing the glass display 
case, he denied taking anything, claiming instead that "Charles 
took everything" (T. 85).3 Defendant repeated essentially the same 
story when he was later questioned by a second officer (T. 96, 
100) . 
Kevin M. Patrick, a serologist at the Utah State Crime 
Lab analyzed the blood on defendant's shirt and blood samples taken 
from the glass display case inside the Gift House (T. 57) . Patrick 
found type 0 antigens on both defendant's shirt and the display 
case blood samples (T. 60-61) . Further, Patrick performed a more 
precise blood identification test and determined that the blood 
samples had the same standard band structure of 2-A, 2-B (T. 62-
65). Based on these results, Patrick concluded that while 45% of 
the population have type 0 blood, only 2.5% of the population have 
standard 2-A, 2-B blood, and that only 1.2% of the population have 
both type 0 and standard 2-A, 2-B blood (T. 65-66). 
3
 Charles Booker was tried and convicted for his 
involvement in the burglary and theft of the Gift House (T. 85). 
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Defendant did not testify at trial or otherwise present 
a defense to the charges. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court should not consider defendant's challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support his theft conviction 
because defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict. Even if the Court were to consider 
the merits of defendant's claim, there was ample evidence before 
the jury to sustain defendant's conviction. 
Additionally, the trial court properly relied on 
defendant's conviction for second degree felony theft to trigger 
application of the habitual criminal statute and to impose an 
enhanced sentence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S THEFT CONVICTION 
In Point I of his brief, defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support his theft conviction (Br. of 
App. at 5-9). His argument should be rejected for failure to 
comply with the marshaling requirements of State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 
732, 783 (Utah App. 1990). 
The power of this Court to review a jury verdict 
challenged on sufficiency of evidence is "quite limited." Id. As 
this Court has recognized, " [i]n challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the burden on the defendant is heavy. Defendant must 
^marshal all evidence supporting the jury's verdict and must then 
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show how this marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the 
verdict even when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict.' " State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citations omitted). 
Defendant has failed to meet this purposefully heavy 
burden. Rather than marshaling all the evidence supporting the 
jury's verdict and then demonstrating how the marshaled evidence is 
insufficient, defendant broadly asserts there was "no" evidence to 
support his theft conviction and further attempts to blend the 
evidence supporting the verdict with that which he believes 
conflicts with the verdict. In essence, defendant merely reargues 
the relative merits of the testimony presented to the jury. 
However, this Court does not sit as a jury, and defendant's attempt 
to reargue the evidence presented at trial is therefore not a 
proper method for challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Accordingly, the Court should refuse to consider defendant's 
insufficiency of evidence claim based on defendant's failure to 
properly marshal the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. 
Even if this Court were to consider defendant's challenge 
to the sufficiency of the evidence, there was ample evidence to 
support defendant's conviction. Rather than recount the evidence 
supporting defendant's conviction, the State refers the Court to 
the Statement of the Facts at pp. 3-7, supra. Viewed in its proper 
light on appeal, the evidence presented at trial provides 
substantial support for the jury's verdict. This Court should 
therefore reject defendant's sufficiency challenge. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPOSITION OF AN ENHANCED 
SENTENCE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-1001 
(1990) WAS PROPER 
In Point II of his brief, defendant narrowly asserts that 
11
 [i] f he was not guilty of theft then he was not convicted of a 
second degree felony as required by [Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 
(1990)] and therefore his sentence was in error" (Br. of App. at 
10). Defendant's assertion lacks merit and should be rejected. 
Section 76-8-1001 provides as follows: 
Any person who has been twice convicted, 
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses 
at least one of which offenses having been at 
least a felony of the second degree or a crime 
which, if committed within this state would 
have been a capital felony, felony of the 
first degree or felony of second degree, and 
was committed to any prison may, upon 
conviction of at least a felony of the second 
degree committed in this state, other than 
murder in the first or second degree, be 
determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
years to life. 
Defendant does not contest the adequacy of his prior felony record 
to support the imposition of an enhanced sentence under section 76-
8-1001. Thus, the only issue is the trial court's reliance on 
defendant's instant theft conviction to trigger application of the 
enhancement statute (T. 106-09, see Addendum). For reasons set 
forth in Point I, supra, the evidence is sufficient to support 
defendant's theft conviction, a second degree felony. Accordingly, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the 
theft conviction to enhance defendant's sentence under section 76-
8-1001. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, defendant's theft 
conviction, and the trial court's consequent imposition of an 
enhanced sentence should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /7 day of August, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
[IAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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RECENT CASES, JOHN. 
MR. CAINE: 
GOT THAT? 
MR. DECARIA: 
MR. CAINE: 
MR. DECARIA: 
SENTENCE ON THE BACK. 
THE COURT: NEEDS TO BE TWICE CONVICTED, SENTENCED, 
LET'S SEE, WE NEED THE SECOND. HAVE YOU 
YEAH, I GOT ~ 
ONE OF THEM NEEDS TO BE A SECOND. 
ONE OF THEM'S A SECOND. LOOK AT THE 
AND COMMITTED. 
MR. CAINE: 
THE COURT: 
MR. CAINE: 
MR. DECARIA: 
MR. CAINE: 
AT LEAST ONE'S A SECOND. 
AT LEAST ONE. 
THESE ARE BOTH THIRDS ~ 
ARE THEY? 
~ MARK. YEAH. YOU KNOW, THERE'S ONE, 
I'M JUST — THERE IT IS, RIGHT THERE. OKAY. LET ME JUST GO 
OVER THESE WITH YOU. YOUR HONOR, I'VE — ARE WE ON THE RECORD 
STILL? 
THE COURT: YEAH. 
MR. CAINE: WE'RE NOW IN THE ENHANCEMENT PHASE OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS. COUNT THREE OF THE INFORMATION ALLEGES THAT MR. 
SCOTT IS A HABITUAL CRIMINAL, AND I HAVE ADVISED MR. SCOTT 
THAT THE LAW IN THIS STATE REQUIRES THAT IN ORDER TO PROVE 
THAT IN EFFECT THIS ENHANCEMENT OR STATUS, THE STATE MUST 
PROVE THAT HE'S BEEN TWICE PREVIOUSLY CONVICTED AND 
IMPRISONED, AND ONE OF THOSE OR BOTH ARE FELONIES HAVING BEEN 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
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24 
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AT LEAST A SECOND DEGREE FELONY. AND THEN HAVING A SUBSEQUENT 
CONVICTION FOR A SECOND DEGREE FELONY. I HAVE BEFORE ME 
MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT 18 A DOCUMENT SHOWING A CONVICTION 
AND A COMMITMENT FOR BURGLARY, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, ON 
SEPTEMBER 22, 1984, JUDGE OMER CALL OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT. AND ALSO EXHIBIT NUMBER 19, A COMMITMENT BY YOUR 
HONOR OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT ON THE 28TH OF JANUARY 
1982 FOR A BURGLARY, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY. 
MR. SCOTT HAS SEEN THOSE, AND YOU WERE IN FACT THE SAME 
INDIVIDUAL THAT WAS COMMITTED ON THOSE COMMITMENTS, WERE YOU 
NOT? 
MR. SCOTT: UH-HUH. 
THE COURT: WHAT DO YOU HAVE — 
MR. CAINE: THE OTHER IS — THERE'S EXHIBIT NUMBER 
20. WELL, IT'S A DIFFERENT CASE. I THOUGHT IT WAS THE SAME 
ONE. THIS IS ALSO A COMMITMENT BY YOUR HONOR, A BURGLARY WITH 
A ONE TO 15 YEARS SENTENCING, BEGINS FEBRUARY 5TH, 1982, IT 
WAS CONCURRENT WITH EXHIBIT NUMBER 19, BUT THEY WERE SEPARATE 
CHARGES. AND THE FOURTH ONE IS AGAIN A SENTENCE BY YOUR 
HONOR, A THIRD DEGREE BURGLARY, DATED THE 9TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 
1987. THAT'S EXHIBIT NUMBER 17. AND FRANKLY, THAT COMPORTS 
WITH OUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT HIS PRIOR FELONY RECORD IS. 
THE COURT: YOU'RE OFFERING THOSE FOR EXHIBITS? 
MR. DECARIA: I AM, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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15 
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22 
23 
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25 
MR. CAINE: 
THE COURT: 
MR. DECARIA: 
MR. CAINE: 
THE COURT: 
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MR. CAINE: NO OBJECTION. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. EACH IS ADMITTED. DO YOU 
HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER? 
MR. DECARIA: NOTHING FROM THE STATE. 
WE HAVE NOTHING, YOUR HONOR. 
SUBMIT IT? 
YES. 
YES. 
WELL, THEN, IT APPEARS THAT HE FITS THAT, 
HE HAS AT LEAST TWICE BEEN SENTENCED ~ CONVICTED, SENTENCED, 
AND COMMITTED ON AT LEAST TWO PREVIOUS FELONIES OF WHICH AT 
LEAST ONE WAS A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, AND NOW HAS BEEN 
CONVICTED OF AN ADDITIONAL SECOND DEGREE FELONY, WHICH WOULD 
PLACE HIM UNDER THE STATUS OF BEING A HABITUAL CRIMINAL. 
MR. CAINE: YOUR HONOR, THE DEFENDANT HAS ADVISED ME 
THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE SENTENCE IMPOSED TODAY AND WAIVE 
THE TIME. 
THE COURT: IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. SCOTT: YEAH. 
THE COURT: YOU'RE ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL TIME. YOU 
UNDERSTAND THAT? 
MR. SCOTT: 
THE COURT: 
ANYWAY. 
MR. CAINE: 
YEAH. 
BUT I UNDERSTAND YOU'RE A RESIDENT 
YES, HE'S PRESENTLY SERVING A SENTENCE AT 
1 
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THE UTAH STATE PRISON. 
THE COURT: WELL, ON THE FINDING OF GUILT OF THE 
OFFENSE OF COUNT ONE, BURGLARY, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, YOU ARE 
SENTENCED TO SERVE A TERM IN THE STATE PENITENTIARY NOT TO 
EXCEED FIVE YEARS. ON THE FINDING OF GUILT OF THE OFFENSE OF 
COUNT TWO, THEFT, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, TOGETHER WITH THE 
FINDING THAT HE WOULD BE WITHIN THE STATUS OF A HABITUAL 
CRIMINAL, THE PENALTY IS ENHANCED TO A TERM OF NOT LESS THAN 
FIVE YEARS AND MAY BE FOR LIFE. 
MR. CAINE: WE'D ASK THOSE RUN CONCURRENTLY, YOUR 
HONOR. 
THE COURT: 
MR. CAINE: 
THE COURT: 
MR. SCOTT: 
MR. CAINE: 
THE COURT: 
I'LL ALLOW THEM TO RUN CONCURRENTLY. 
THANK YOU. 
ANYTHING FURTHER? 
NO. 
NO, WE HAVE NOTHING FURTHER, YOUR HONOR. 
ALL RIGHT. THEN WE'LL BE IN RECESS. 
***** 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF WEBER) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 109 PAGES OF 
TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY AS A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH. 
DATED AT OGDEN, UTAH THIS 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 1992. 
DEAN C. OLSEN 
